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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In order to apply the Enhanced ERTMS/ETCS Functional Architecture, capable of using GNSS and 
Public Radio TLC Technologies, the safety aspects of the ERTMS/ETCS system upon the future 
application of the above mentioned positioning and communication technologies have to be 
investigated. 
 
This document describes the Quantitative Safety and Hazard Analysis carried out in ERSAT GGC 
WP3 - Task 3.2 and reports the relative results. 
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ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS 
Acronym Description 
AL Alert Limit 
APV Approach with Vertical Guidance 
ATPE Along Track Position Error 
ATPL Along Track Protection Level 
BG Balise Group 
BTM Balise Transmission Module 
DB Database 
ERSAT-GGC ERTMS on SATellite – Galileo Game Changer 
ERTMS European Rail Traffic Management System 
ETCS European Train Control System 
ETS Eurobalise Transmission System 
FDE Fault Detection and Exclusion 
FMECA Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis 
GAD/TV GNSS Augmentation Dissemination/ Trackside Verification 
GIVE Grid Ionospheric Vertical Error 
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System 
HW Hardware 
LOS Line of Sight 
MA Movement Authority 
MDE Minimum Detectable Error 
MI Misleading Information 
MLCP Multi-Link Communication Platform 
MTCP Multipath TCP 
NLOS Non Line of Sight 
PBG Physical Balise Group 
PL Protection Level 
PR Pseudo-range 
PVT Position, Velocity, Time 
QoS Quality of Service 
RAIM Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring 
RBC Radio Block Center 
SIL Safety Integrity Level 
SIS Signal In Space 
SoM Start Of Mission 
SOW Scope of Work 
STI Standard for Technical Interoperability 
SW Software 
THR Tolerable Hazard Rate 
TLC Telecommunication 
TMS Traffic Management System 
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Acronym Description 
TTA Time To Alarm or Time to Alert 
UDRE User Differential Range Error 
VB Virtual Balise 
VBD Virtual Balise Detection 
VBG Virtual Balise Group 
VBR Virtual Balise Reader 
VBTS Virtual Balise Transmission System 
WP Work Package 
Table 1 – Acronyms 
 
Term Description 
Q_STATUS Status of SoM position report (UNISIG SUBSET-026 [R3]) 
Information Point 
Specific location on the track where information can be transmitted 
from ERTMS/ETCS trackside to ERTMS/ETCS on-board equipment 
(UNISIG SUBSET-023 [R4])  
VBTS-related 
messages 
The messages exchanged between on-board and trackside VBTS 
functional blocks concerning e.g. Command & Control and/or 
Augmentation & Integrity (see D 2.1 [R1]) 
Table 2 - Definitions 
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1. BACKGROUND 
ERSAT GGC (Grant Agreement No 776039) is a project of the RFI ERSAT program launched in 
2012 for integrating satellite technology on ERTMS platform. The primary goals of ERSAT GGC is 
to launch an operational line by 2020 and accelerate the standardization process at European level 
for including the satellite technology in the new ERTMS Standard for Technical Interoperability 
(STI). 
 
In the framework of the Project ERSAT GGC, the WP3 is related to Safety and Hazard Analysis of 
the Enhanced ERTMS Functional Architecture, defined through the WP2 activities and previous 
related research projects, for the introduction of the GNSS technology, and consequently derived 
Virtual Balise concept, and Public Radio TLC Communication Network. 
It is noteworthy that the Enhanced ERTMS Functional Architecture has been defined aiming at 
reaching: 
 A minimum impact on current specifications; 
 A functional retrofit UNISIG Compliant; 
 The achievement of the SIL 4 safety integrity level. 
The WP3 activities are split into two main tasks: 
 Task 3.1, addressed in Deliverable: ERSAT_GGC_WP3_D3.1, “Safety Analysis of ERSAT 
ERTMS Application over GNSS” Rev 0.2, which identifies and qualitatively assesses the 
hazardous failures potentially arisen after the integration of the Virtual Balise concept and 
Public Radio TLC related functional blocks within the current ERTMS architecture; 
 Task 3.2, aims at addressing the quantitative aspects of the safety analysis and deriving 
the Tolerable Hazard Rates to be fulfilled to ensure a safe use of the architecture, the 
compliance with reference regulations and the technical interoperability. 
The present report, referred as deliverable D3.2, is the output of the Task 3.2. 
 
The Quantitative analysis developed herein aims at defining the targets enabling the technical 
interoperability for the safety-related functions of the ERSAT-GGC Enhanced ERTMS Architecture, 
which integrates the GNSS based Virtual Balise Concept. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
` 
 
 
   
Project: ERSAT GGC 
 
 9 
GNSS Quantitative Analysis for ERSAT 
GGC  
     
                                     
 
2. OBJECTIVE 
The aim of this document is to complete the set of Safety and Hazard Analysis for ERSAT-GGC 
Enhanced ERTMS architecture providing a reference Fault Tree and related numerical targets for 
the rates of the technical failures, due to the novel function integration, affecting ETCS safety. 
The resulting Tolerable Hazard Rates should support future suppliers in the Interoperability 
verification. 
In line with previous NGTC D7.7 [R11] analysis, this work has been carried out according with 
SUBSET-091 [R7] and SUBSET-088 Part 3 [R6]  apportionment approach. 
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3. INTRODUCTION 
The Quantitative analysis object of this Deliverable is structured as detailed below. 
 
Section §1 provides the ERSAT GGC project background and the WP3 role description. 
 
Section §2 presents the objective of the present analysis.  
 
Section §3, the present Section, provides the document structure overview.  
 
Section §4 outlines the GNSS Quantitative Analysis focus. 
 
Section §5 reports the analysis references and derived approach.  
 
Section §6 presents the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) Methodology.  
 
Section §7 presents the Preliminary Fault Tree Analysis, focused on the ETCS Core Hazard 
apportionment, including VBTS integration. 
 
Section §8 presents the Hazards applicable to the generic Balise Transmission System. 
 
Section §9 presents the protection means against the Virtual Balise Transmission System Hazards. 
 
Section § 10 provides some consideration on the Virtual Balise Transmission System Hazards 
based on the Operational conditions.  
 
Section § 11 reviews the Preliminary ETCS Core Hazard apportionment of § 7 down to the Balise 
Transmission Subsystem upon the specific Operational Scenario. 
 
Section § 12 presents the top-down Virtual Balise Transmission System Hazard rate 
apportionment, amending the preliminary allocation on the basis of § 8, § 9 and § 10 outcomes, 
and the final considerations upon the performed THR apportionment for the Enhanced ERTMS 
Functional Architecture interoperability. 
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4. THE ANALYSIS FOCUS 
In line with the qualitative study performed in D3.1 [R2], the Safety and Hazard analysis scope 
focuses on the integration of the Virtual Balise Transmission System and GNSS interface. The 
Public TLC Networks are out of the Safety scope of Work, see D3.1 [R2]. 
 
With reference to ERSAT-GGC Enhanced ERTMS Functional Architecture defined in [R1], the 
VBTS has been classified as:  
 Trusted (safe) parts: 
o Virtual Balise Reader safety related Functions, 
o GNSS Augmentation Dissemination / Trackside Verification Functions; 
 Non trusted parts: 
o Global Navigation Satellite total System, the combined ground and airborne subsystems, 
referring to its role as a source of positioning errors (i.e. feared events originating from 
satellite failures, such as ephemeris errors, 
o pseudorange / clock errors; and feared events related to failures within the augmentation 
system);  
o GNSS Signal in Space, referring to its role as a source of positioning errors (i.e. feared 
events originating from the propagation environment including); 
o On-board GNSS antenna. 
The VBTS integration within the ERTMS/ETCS have as primary object the large application of 
ETCS (that can be enabled by less expensive implementation) to Conventional railway lines without 
decreasing the current ETCS safety level.  
 
The minimum impact on the existing UNISIG approved Reference Architecture has been the key-
points that guided the definition of the ERSAT-GGC Enhanced ERTMS Functional Architecture 
(see [R1]). 
 
In order not to change or to minimize the modification on the current specification and the ERTMS 
system architecture, the technical interoperability between the current physical balise technology 
and the virtual balise one (that would be functionally equivalent to the current one) shall be ensured 
in the applicable ERTMS operational scenarios. 
Specifically, the interoperability is required for both the on-board and the trackside functional blocks 
and interfaces (GNSS air gap included) enabling the Virtual Balise detection, which ensure the 
integrity of the retrieved train position.  
 
This analysis moving from the already performed Functional FMECA (please refer to [R2]), aims 
at:  
 Modelling the combination of the current ETCS functions with the VBTS ones, and related 
technical failures that can threat the ETCS safety. The VBTS interfaces with ETCS and the 
airgap with GNSS are especially explored; 
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 Identifying the safety targets (the Tolerable Hazard Rates (THR)) for the VBTS related 
hazards by apportioning the ETCS global safety target (refer to analysis methodology 
described in § 5); 
 If necessary, amending the THR against the specific operational scenarios (those defined 
in ERSAT-GGC Deliverable D2.1 [R1]); 
 Synthetizing in a conclusion the numerical targets to be fulfilled to ensure the safety and 
interoperability of the Enhanced ERTMS/ETCS functions. 
Note: Since the Virtual Balise information is stored on-board before its use , the VB concept is not 
applicable to ETCS Level 1 based on switchable Eurobalises, but instead addresses at least in 
ETCS Level 2. 
 
Thus, the analysis itself and the related outcomes would support the future suppliers in the safety 
and interoperability verification of the Enhanced ETCS at least Level 2 applications. 
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5. REFERENCES AND GENERALITIES FOR THE QUANTITATIVE 
SAFETY ANALYSIS 
The starting point of this GNSS quantitative analysis for ERSAT-GGC Enhanced ERTMS 
Architecture is the analysis and related results developed in Deliverable 7.7- Annex F [R11] of the 
NGTC project. The ERSAT-GGC functional architecture has confirmed or revised some ETCS 
enhanced functionalities (e.g. the use of the Track Database information) reaching a higher stability 
with respect to NGTC Project.  
Therefore, the quantitative safety analysis carried out herein takes as starting reference the NGTC 
targets and confirm or amend them based on the following inputs: 
 ERSAT-GGC D2.1 [R1], which describes the Enhanced ERTMS Functional architecture 
and the ERSAT-GG considered ERTMS Operational Scenarios; 
 ERSAT-GGC D3.1 Functional FMECA [R2], which provide awareness about the hazardous 
technical failure modes that can arise due to the integration of GNSS information and 
related enhanced functionalities that can affect the ETCS safety. 
In line with NGTC D7.7 Annex F analysis [R11], the present document develops a Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA) based on SUBSET-091 [R7] apportionment, which apportions the approved 
Tolerable Hazard Rate for technical failures of ETCS equally between On-board and Trackside 
parts.  
 
Furthermore, as per the project purpose aiming at the minimum impact on the existing 
ERTMS/ETCS Level 2 reference architecture, the analysis keeps as reference the SUBSET-091 
[R7] for the high-level quantitative safety requirements given as minimum targets to ensure that 
ETCS may be safely integrated in any interoperable railway system. 
 
As far as the mission profile is concerned, the analysis keeps the same figures as the ones of the 
UNISIG Subset-091 [R7]. 
 
Standing the scope of the ERSAT GGC project, the assumptions for the standard mission profile 
can be considered applicable with a conservative level of confidence. Anyhow, it shall be observed 
that the technical solution might bring to reduce the number of installed balise groups along the 
trackside with respect of the assumptions made by UNISIG Subset-091 mission profile [R7]. Then 
each on board supplier shall verify that this condition does not impact negatively the BTM safety 
performances considering the specific trackside project [ERSAT_GGC_D3.2_07].  
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6. FAULT TREE ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
The analysis has been developed following the top down apportionment of the existing UNISIG 
THR for ETCS reference architecture of SUBSET-091 [R7] and SUBSET-088 Part 3 [R6].  
 
The FTA is based on the ETCS Core Hazard THR apportionment for to the hazard rates of the 
UNISIG grouping of constituents undertaken in Subset-088 Part 3, and introduces the VBTS 
functions within the grouping of constituents (i.e. On-board, Trackside and Transmission 
Subsystem).  
 
Concerning the VBTS, it is referred as safety-related transmission system (as per EN 50159 [R10]), 
functionally consistent with the existing Eurobalise Transmission System (ETS). 
 
Keeping the SUBSET-088 Part 3 analysis structure, first a preliminary target allocation for 
equipment and specific functions is performed, afterward the allocation is amended in order to 
consider the operational aspects, the protective features inherent in the design of ETCS and the 
frequency of occurrence of operational events in Conventional Rail. 
 
Specifically: 
 Section §7 develops an initial THR apportionment down to the three grouping of 
constituents of the ERTMS reference architecture: i.e. ETCS on-board, trackside and 
transmission systems. The Balise Transmission System analysis herein is left undeveloped 
and explored later against specific conditions. This preliminary apportionment reviews the 
one of SUBSET-088 Part 3 in order to include VBTS related hazards; 
 Section §8 presents and preliminary analyse the Balise Transmission Systems hazards;  
 Section §9, focusing on VBTS, presents the protection means Virtual Balise Group Deletion 
and Insertion Hazards; and accordingly amends the preliminary allocated targets; 
 Section §10 analyses Virtual Balise Group Deletion and Insertion Hazards in specific 
Operational Scenarios; 
 Section §11 develops the VBTS THR apportionment down to its related Hazards, revising 
the preliminary allocation on the basis of the related protections (presented in §9 ) and 
critical operational scenarios (presented in §10). 
. 
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7. THE PRELIMINARY FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 
This Section develops an initial ETCS THR apportionment process for the Enhanced 
ERTMS/ETCS Functional Architecture (described in ERSAT-GGC D2.1 [R1]), according to the 
methodology described in §6. 
 
According to SUBSET-088 Part 3 [R6], the apportionment is taken to a point define the maximum 
tolerable hazard rates required to ensure technical interoperability whilst leaving freedom for an 
implementation that best suits a suppliers expertise and technology base. 
 
7.1 THE PRELIMINARY ETCS CORE HAZARD 
APPORTIONMENT 
This part of the document is preliminary apportioning the approved Tolerable Hazard Rate for 
technical failures of ETCS to Onboard and Trackside equipment, including the relative VBTS 
functions, for interoperability purpose. 
 
Although the VBTS integration, the ETCS system shall maintain its role as defined in Subset-91 
[R7]: 
 
“To provide the driver with information to enable him to drive his train safely and to 
enforce respect of this information to the extent advised to ETCS.“ 
 
The associated hazard is the referred ETCS Core Hazard: 
 
“Exceedance of safe speed or distance limits as advised to ETCS” 
 
According to SUBSET-091 [R7], the maximum allowed rate of occurrence of the ETCS Core 
Hazard is 2.0*10-9/ hour; i.e. 1.0*10-9/ hour for ETCS on-board installed on a train and 1.0*10-9/ 
hour for ETCS trackside installed in an area visited by a train during a reference mission. 
 
SUBSET-091 [R7] allocates the hazardous events as either ‘on-board events’, ‘trackside events’ 
or ‘transmission events’. Based on a uniform apportionment of 2.0*10-9/ hour, 0.67*10-9/ hour is 
allocated to each grouping of constituents. Nevertheless the functions corresponding to the 
‘transmission events’ are allocated to the on-board or trackside equipment, in order to respect the 
equal values of THR for on-board and track-side ETCS equipment (see SUBSET-091 [R7]).  
 
The quantitative safety requirements for pure on-board and trackside functions are referred as 
THR-ONBOARD and THR-TRACKSIDE, respectively. These targets are maintained as per 
SUBSET-091 [R7], but the list of respective subordinate events is revised to address the ETCS 
Level 2 equipment and VBTS functions hazards, as described in § 7.1.1 and § 7.1.2.  
 
Analogously, the hazard apportionment for the Transmission Systems (i.e. THR-TX) is maintained, 
but the relative subordinate events list is re-elaborated to include the VBTS functions.  
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Furthermore, the THR-TX figure is further explored and elaborated in next sections.  
 
Note: herein THR-BTX is not referring only the Eurobalise Transmission System, but VBTS as well. 
 
The ETCS Core THR is apportioned down to the constituent groupings against a definition of the 
role of that constituent and its related safety hazard, on the basis of system hazardous events 
identified in SUBSET-088 [R6], where applicable, and the new ones derived in ERSAT-GGC D3.1 
FMECA analysis [R2].  
 
Figure 1 reports the preliminary apportionment of the ETCS THR down to on-board, trackside and 
transmission subsystem hazards, including VBTS. 
 
For the sake of traceability, the modifications with respect to SUBSET-088 Part 3 are traced in 
different colours: 
 All the gates and events modified with respect SUBSET-088 Part 3 in either description or 
apportionment after VBTS integration are traced in orange colour; 
 All the new gates and events as introduced herein are traced in grey colour. 
Further details are provided in Table 3. 
 
Figure 1 – Preliminary ETCS Core Hazard apportionment - On-board and Trackside 
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FT Gate / Event Description Apportioned THR Remarks 
THR-ETCS The ETCS Core Hazard 2E-9/h As per Subset-091 [R7] 
THR-ONBOARD 
The ETCS Onboard Subsystem 
“Trusted” part (e.g. Odo, Kernel, On-
board EUR, BTM, VBR) hazards 
0.67E-9/h 
THR as per Subset-091 
[R7] 
Refer to § 7.1.1 for the 
relative top-down 
apportionment. 
THR-TRACKSIDE 
The ETCS Trackside Subsystem 
“Trusted” part (e.g. RBC Kernel, 
Trackside EUR, Trackside VBTS) 
hazards   
0.67E-9/h 
THR as per Subset-091 
[R7] 
Refer to § 7.1.2 for the 
relative top-down 
apportionment. 
THR-TX 
The ETCS Transmission Subsystem - 
“Non Trusted” part  (e.g. BTM, VBR, 
On-board EUR, EUB, Trackside EUR, 
GAD/TV) hazards 
0.67E-9/h 
THR as per Subset-091 
[R7]  
THR-RTX Radio subsystem hazards 1E-11/h 
THR as per Subset-088- 
Part 3 [R6], negligible with 
respect to THR-BTX. 
Refer to § 7.1.3 for the 
relative top-down 
apportionment. 
THR-BTX 
Balise Transmission Subsystem 
hazards 
0.67E-9/h 
Preliminary THR as per 
Subset-088- Part 3 [R6]. 
Table 3 – The detail of preliminary ETCS Core hazard THR apportionment 
The targets provided here above have to be referred as preliminary since no operational 
assumptions have been done.  
 
Regardless the use of Physical or Virtual Balises, the Balise Transmission system and its 
associated hazards are analysed in dedicated Chapters (see §8, §9, §10 and §11). This separate 
analysis is necessary because of the complexity of the analysis resulting from the many uses of 
the balise sub-system within ETCS.  
 
In the following the further apportionment of THR-ONBOARD, THR-TRACKSIDE and THR-RTX 
are provided. 
7.1.1 The THR-ONBOARD Apportionment 
This section details the apportionment of the THR-ONBOARD gate among the subordinate events 
relative to the purely on-board, trusted functions. According to SUBSET-091 [R7], the ETCS On-
board (i.e. excluding the non-trusted transmission functions) must not contribute to the ETCS Core 
Hazard with a failure rate greater than 1/3 * THR-ETCS. 
 
Therefore, THR-ONBOARD = 0.67 * 10-9 dangerous failures/ hour 
 
The THR-ONBOARD apportionment considered herein is shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 – The THR-ONBOARD apportionment. 
Each supplier shall prove the attainment of the THR-ONBOARD, considering, in its specific 
analysis (e.g., fault tree) for the equipment, at least the following hazardous events (on the basis 
of SUBSET-088 Part 3 § 7.1.1.2): 
 KERNEL - 1-34 
 ODO - 1-4 
 TI - 1-8, 10, 11 
 MMI–1 - MMI-6 
 BTM-H4;  
 OB-EUR-H4. 
Furthermore, due to the VBTS introduction, the following new hazardous event parallel to BTM-H4 
shall be accounted: 
 VBR-H4: Delivery to the on-board kernel of an erroneous Balise Information, interpretable 
as correct, due to failure within the on-board VBR function. 
Note: with respect to SUBSET-088 Part 3: 
 LTM-H4 event has not been considered since not relevant for the ERTMS Level 2 
applications that use Virtual Balises; 
 OB-EUR-H4 event description has been modified to account also VBTS-related messages. 
The apportionment is summed up in Table 4. As per SUBSET-088 Part 3, the THR allocation of 
the subordinate events is to be undertaken by the supplier. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THR-ONBOARD
1
Onboard functions
("trusted" parts):
Onboard Kernel, ODO,
TI, DMI, BTM, VBR,
Onboard EUR hazards
KERNEL
Hazards from
on-board kernel
(KERNEL-1 to
KERNEL-34)
ODO
Hazards from
odometry
(ODO-1 to
ODO-4)
TI
Hazards from
Train Interface
(TI - 1-8, 10, 11)
MMI
Hazards from
Man Machine
Interface (MMI-1
to MMI-6)
VBR-H4
Delivery  to the on-board
kernel of an erroneous
balise information,
interpretable as correct,
due to failure within the
onboard VBR function
BTM-H4
Transmission to the
on-board kernel of an
erroneous telegram,
interpretable as correct,
due to failure within the
onboard BTM function
OB-EUR-H4
Radio message (incl.
GAD/TV mes.) corrupted
on the on-board
Euroradio, such that the
message appears as
consistent
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FT Gate / Event Description Apportioned THR Remarks 
THR-ONBOARD 
The ETCS On-board Subsystem 
“Trusted” part (e.g. Odo, Kernel, On-
board EUR, BTM, VBR) hazards 
0.67E-9/h 
THR as per Subset-091 
[R7]  
KERNEL Hazards from On-board Kernel function - 
Events KERNEL - 1-34 
accounted, as per Subset-
088 Part 3 [R6] 
ODO Hazards from Odometry function - 
Events ODO - 1-4 
accounted as per Subset-
088 Part 3 [R6] 
TI Hazards from Train Interface - 
Events TI - 1-8, 10, 11 
accounted as per Subset-
088 Part 3 [R6] 
MMI Hazards from Man Machine Interface - 
Events MMI–1 – MMI-6 
accounted as per Subset-
088- Part 3 [R6] 
VBR-H4 
Delivery to the on-board kernel of 
erroneous balise information, 
interpretable as correct, due to failure 
within the onboard VBR function 
- 
New hazardous event 
related to the on-board 
VBTS “Trusted” parts.  
See Note 1 below. 
BTM-H4 
Transmission to the on-board kernel of 
an erroneous telegram, interpretable as 
correct, due to failure within the 
onboard BTM function 
- 
Event as per Subset-088 
Part 3 [R6] 
OB-EUR-H4 
Radio message (incl. GADTV mes.) 
corrupted in onboard Euroradio, such 
that the message appears as consistent 
- 
Event based on Subset-
088- Part 3 [R6], but re-
defined to account also 
GAD/TV messages 
corruption. 
Table 4 - The detail THR-ONBOARD apportionment 
Note 1:  
According to [R1], the on-board is assumed as a unique safe platform equipped with both VBR and 
BTM functions (in the EVC perspective VBR is functionally equivalent to BTM), which are mutually 
exclusive or the BTM functions prevail on the VBR functions. 
During the train run: 
 the BTM generates the tele powering signal to energize any Eurobalise that it can encounter 
and receive/decode the telegrams sent by the correct passed physical balises;  
 the VBR periodically computes the estimated GNSS-based position of the GNSS Antenna 
installed on the train roof and projected to the track (Virtual Antenna reference mark), and 
compares it with the locations associated with the virtual balises stored in the on-board track 
database.  
 
As a principle of correct design of the signalling system the overlapping between the VBR and BTM 
should be avoided except in specific locations due to safety purposes which assigns priority to the 
BTM information.  
 
Considering this mutual exclusion between VBR and BTM functions and the highest priority 
assigned to the BTM functions w.r.t. VBR ones, the higher gate THR-ONBOARD is not modified. 
In other words, should a PBG detection coincide with the VBG detection, the PBG is dominant.  
 
 
 
 
 
` 
 
 
   
Project: ERSAT GGC 
 
 20 
GNSS Quantitative Analysis for ERSAT 
GGC  
     
                                     
 
7.1.2 The THR-TRACKSIDE Apportionment 
This section details the apportionment of the THR-TRACKSIDE gate among the subordinate events 
relative to the purely trackside, trusted functions. According to SUBSET-091 [R7], the ETCS 
Trackside (i.e. excluding the non-trusted transmission functions) must not contribute to the ETCS 
Core Hazard with a failure rate greater than 1/3 * THR-ETCS. 
 
Therefore, THR-TRACKSIDE= 0.67 * 10-9 dangerous failures/ hour. 
 
Based on SUBSET-088 Part 3 § 8.1.1.4, each supplier shall prove the attainment of the THR-
TRACKSIDE considering, in its specific analysis (e.g., fault tree), the following events:  
 RBC-2, RBC-3 and RBC-4;  
Note: Since the RBC handover is out of scope for ERSAT-GGC project, thus RBC-3 and 
RBC-4 are unchanged. 
 TR-EUR-H4 for the parts of the hazard that arise due to failures inside the trusted part of 
the trackside transmission channel. The event description has been modified to include 
potential failure effects on GAD/TV messages as well. 
Note that the introduction of the GAD/TV messages, since a minor percentage of the radio 
messages, does not change the THR-TRACKSIDE target with respect to SUBSET-091. 
The THR-TRACKSIDE apportionment considered herein is shown in Figure 3 and described in 
Table 5. As per SUBSET-088 Part 3, the THR allocation of the subordinate events is to be 
undertaken by the supplier. 
 
 
Figure 3 – The THR-TRACKSIDE Apportionment 
THR-TRACKSIDE
1
Trackside functions
("trusted" parts): RBC
kernel, and trackside
EUR hazards
RBC-2
Incorrect RBC radio
message sent from the
RBC kernel functions,
such that message
appears consistent
RBC-3
The RBC misinterprets
a message from an
adjacent RBC, causing
incorrect message to
ETCS onboard
RBC-4
The RBC gives
an erroneous
message to an
adjacent RBC
TR-EUR-H4
Radio message (incl.
GAD/TV mes.) corrupted in
the trackside Euroradio,
such that message
appears as consistent
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FT Gate / Event Description Apportioned THR Remarks 
THR-TRACKSIDE 
Trackside functions ("trusted" parts): 
RBC kernel, trackside EUR, trackside 
VBTS hazards 
0.67E-9/h 
THR as per Subset-091 
[R7]. 
RBC-2 
Incorrect RBC radio message sent from 
the RBC kernel functions, such that 
message appears consistent  
- 
As per Subset-088- Part 3 
[R6] 
RBC-3 
Incorrect adjacent RBC message sent or 
received by RBC kernel functions as 
correct, causing an incorrect message to 
be sent to ETCS kernel  
- 
As per Subset-088- Part 3 
[R6] 
RBC-4 The RBC gives an erroneous message to 
an adjacent RBC  
- 
As per Subset-088- Part 3 
[R6] 
TR-EUR-H4 
Radio message (incl. GAD/TV mes.) 
corrupted in the trackside Euroradio, 
such that the message appears as 
consistent. 
- 
Subset-088- Part 3 [R6] 
event modified to also 
include failure effects on 
GAD/TV messages 
Table 5 - The detail THR-TRACKSIDE apportionment 
7.1.3 The THR-RTX Apportionment 
This section details the apportionment of the THR-RTX gate among the subordinate events relative 
to non-trusted parts of the communication channel in both the on-board and trackside sub systems, 
after VBTS integration.  
 
In Subset 088 Part 3, the THR-RTX contribution to ETCS Core Hazard is considered negligible (i.e. 
with respect to Balise Transmission System) since the signalling rules mitigating the radio 
messages Deletion and the protection mechanisms against their Corruption.  
 
Provided the combination of the existing signalling rules with the relevant D3.1 [R2] safety 
requirements, the VBTS-related radio messages are assumed to be analogously protected against 
Deletion and Corruption.  
Specifically, REQ. 001, REQ. 002, REQ. 017 (please refer to [R2] for major detail)  aim at mitigating 
the VBTS radio messages Deletion, while the VBTS message Corruption is avoided and controlled 
with REQ. 012, REQ. 015 and REQ. 016 (please refer to [R2] for major detail). 
 
Therefore the safety target THR-RTX = 1.0 * 10-11 dangerous failures per hour is maintained.  
 
The THR-RTX apportionment considered herein is shown in Figure 4 and described in Table 6. As 
per SUBSET-088 Part 3, the THR allocation of the subordinate events is to be undertaken by the 
supplier. 
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Figure 4 – The THR-RTX Apportionment 
 
FT Gate / Event Description Apportioned THR Remarks 
THR-RTX 
Radio Subsystem Hazard  1E-11/h 
THR as per Subset-088- 
Part 3 [R6].  
TRANS-OB/RADIO-1 
Corruption Hazard -
Incorrect radio message 
received by the on-board 
kernel functions as 
consistent 
- 
As per Subset-088- Part 3 
[R6] 
TRANS-OB/RADIO-2 
Deletion Hazard - Radio 
message not received by 
the on-board kernel 
functions 
Negligible 
Due to the signalling rules, 
the deletion it is not 
classed as a hazard, as 
per SUBSET-088 Part 3, § 
9.2.2.3. 
TRANS-TS/RADIO-1 
Corruption Hazard - 
Incorrect on-board radio 
message received by the 
RBC kernel functions as 
consistent 
- 
As per Subset-088- Part 3 
[R6] 
TR-EUR-H4 
Radio message (incl. 
GAD/TV mes.) corrupted 
in the trackside Euroradio, 
such that the message 
appears as consistent. 
- 
The Subset-088- Part 3 
[R6] event modified to also 
include effects on GAD/TV 
messages Note that the 
introduction of the GAD/TV 
messages, since a minor 
percentage of the radio 
THR- RTX
1
Radio subsystem
hazard
TRANS-OB/RADIO-1
Corruption hazard -
Incorrect  radio
message received by
on-board kernel
functions as consistent
TRANS-OB/RADIO-2
Deletion Hazard -
Radio message not
received by the
on-board kernel
functions
TRANS-TS/RADIO-1
Corruption Hazard -
Incorrect on-board radio
message received by
the RBC  kernel
functions as consistent
TR-EUR-H4
Radio message (incl.
GAD/TV mes.) corrupted in
the trackside Euroradio,
such that message
appears as consistent
OB-EUR-H4
Radio message (incl.
GAD/TV mes.) corrupted
on the on-board Euroradio,
such that the message
appears as consistent
TR-EUR-H4
Radio message (incl.
GAD/TV mes.) corrupted in
the trackside Euroradio,
such that message
appears as consistent
OB-EUR-H4
Radio message (incl.
GAD/TV mes.) corrupted
on the on-board Euroradio,
such that the message
appears as consistent
TR-EUR-H1
Radio message (incl.
GAD/TV mes.) deleted
in the trackside in an
undetectable way
OB-EUR-H1
Radio message (incl.
GAD/TV mes.) deleted
in the on-board in an
undetectable way
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FT Gate / Event Description Apportioned THR Remarks 
messages, does not 
change THR-RTX target 
with respect to SUBSET-
088. 
OB-EUR-H4 
Radio message (incl. 
GADTV mes.) corrupted in 
onboard Euroradio, such 
that the message appears 
as consistent  
- 
The Subset-088- Part 3 
[R6] event modified to also 
include effects on GAD/TV 
messages. Note that the 
introduction of the GAD/TV 
messages, since a minor 
percentage of the radio 
messages, does not 
change THR-RTX target 
with respect to SUBSET-
088. 
TR-EUR-H1 
Radio message (incl. 
GAD/TV mes.) deleted in 
the trackside in an 
undetectable way 
- 
The Subset-088- Part 3 
[R6] event modified to also 
include effects on GAD/TV 
messages. Note that the 
introduction of the GAD/TV 
messages, since a minor 
percentage of the radio 
messages, does not 
change THR-RTX target 
with respect to SUBSET-
088. 
OB-EUR-H1 
Radio message (incl. 
GAD/TV mes.) deleted in 
the on-board in an 
undetectable way 
- 
The Subset-088- Part 3 
[R6] event modified to also 
include effects on GAD/TV 
messages. Note that the 
introduction of the GAD/TV 
messages, since a minor 
percentage of the radio 
messages, does not 
change THR-RTX target 
with respect to SUBSET-
088. 
Table 6 - The detail THR-RTX apportionment. 
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8. THE INFORMATION POINT HAZARDS 
This Section focuses on the generic Balise Transmission Systems hazards. 
 
Note, herein THR-BTX is referred as the maximum rate allocated to the generic Balise 
Transmission System. In the following Sections, depending on the specific scenario, THR-BTX is 
specified in THR-EBTX or THR-VBTX, in order to distinguish the ETS and VBTS responsibility. 
 
Note: Since the use of VBR or BTM is assumed mutually excluding, the same mutual exclusion is 
holding for THR-EBTX or THR-VBTX. 
 
The functional analysis of SUBSET-088 Part 2 [R6] has identified and associated to ETS the 
following hazards:  
 TRANS-BALISE-1: Incorrect balise group message that is received by the on-board kernel 
functions as consistent (the Corruption Hazard); 
 TRANS-BALISE-2: Balise group not detected by the on-board kernel functions (the Deletion 
Hazard); 
 TRANS-BALISE-3: Inserted balise group message received by the on-board kernel 
functions as consistent (the Insertion or Cross Talk Hazard). 
Concerning VBTS, the Functional FMECA analysis developed in ERSAT-GGC D3.1 [R2] against 
the ETCS Enhanced architecture, identified the following failures modes affecting the Virtual  Balise 
information: 
 FI-K 1.4.1.2: The Virtual Balise information is corrupted - The EVC receives a formally 
Valid VBR information, but it carries an undue (wrong) information content; 
 FI-K 1.4.1.1: The Virtual Balise information is lost - The EVC does not receive the 
information (user bits, time stamp, detection error) upon the last VB (e.g. VBG_A); 
 FB-K 1.4.4: The VBR output information is other than the expected - Although the block 
has detected the crossing VB (e.g. VBG_A), it outputs the information relative to an undue 
(i.e. wrong) VB. 
These three hazardous events lead to hazards analogous to TRANS-BALISE-1, TRANS-BALISE 
-2 and TRANS-BALISE -3.  
 
Therefore, this analysis considers the three abovementioned Hazard as applicable to VBTS as well 
and these are specifically referred as:  
 TRANS-VBALISE-1: Incorrect VBG message that is received by the on-board kernel 
functions as consistent (Corruption Hazard); 
 TRANS-VBALISE-2: VBG not detected by the on-board functions (Deletion Hazard); 
 TRANS-VBALISE-3: Inserted VBG message received by the on-board kernel functions as 
consistent (Cross-talk Hazard) 
For VBTS, as for ETS in SUBSET-088 Part 3, the THR-VBTX is initially apportioned among the 
three subordinate Hazards in a uniform way.  
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Concerning TRANS-VBALISE-1, since the Virtual Balise information is received from a SIL 4 
platform (i.e RBC) via the safe and secure Euroradio protocol stack and it is stored in the Track 
DB, the referred Hazard can occur only after a Track DB corruption (please, refer to § 11.3.1 for 
major detail). This event shall be demonstrated to be negligible, since the safe storage and robust 
transmission. 
 
Therefore (analogously to ETS analysis in SUBSET-088 Part 3) the initial 1/3*THR-VBTX 
apportionment shall be amended. Specifically, TRANS-VBALISE-1 is considered negligible with 
respect to TRANS-VBALISE-2 and 3. The 50% of THR-VBTX, equal to 0.33*10-9 dangerous failures 
per hour, is now allocated to TRANS-VBALISE-2 and 3. 
 
Provided the same apportionment of THR-EBTX and THR-VBTX among the Corruption, Deletion 
and Cross-Talk Hazards, Figure 5 and Table 7 should be read as applicable to the generic Balise 
System Hazard. E.g. TRANS-BALISE-1 should be referred as the Corruption Hazard affecting the 
generic BG, then depending on the specific scenario, TRANS-BALISE-1 may be specified in 
TRANS-EBALISE-1 or TRANS-VBALISE-1, in order to distinguish the ETS and VBTS 
responsibility. 
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Figure 5 – Preliminary ETCS Core Hazard apportionment to Balise Transmission System 
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FT Gate / Event Description Apportioned THR Remarks 
THR-BTX 
Balise Transmission Subsystem 
hazards 
0.67E-9/h 
Preliminary THR as per 
Subset-088- Part 3 [R6], 
but also applicable to 
THR-VBTX  
TRANS-BALISE-1 Balise Corruption Hazard 1E-11/h 
Negligible with respect to 
TRANS-BALISE-2, 3, as 
per Subset-088- Part 3 
[R6]. Also applicable to 
TRANS-VBALISE-1 
TRANS-BALISE-2 Balise Deletion Hazard 0.33E-9/h 
50% of THR-BTX, as per 
Subset-088- Part 3 [R6].  
Also applicable to TRANS-
VBALISE-2 
TRANS-BALISE-3 Balise Insertion Hazard 0.33E-9/h 
50% of THR-BTX, as per 
Subset-088- Part 3 [R6].  
Also applicable to TRANS-
VBALISE-3 
Table 7 - The detail THR ETCS apportionment down to the generic Balise Transmission System hazards. 
Please, note that the same preliminary apportionment for Virtual Balise hazards was provided in 
NGTC project [R11]. 
9. PROTECTION AGAINST TRANS-VBALISE-2 AND 3 
This Section presents the ETCS inherent protection and/or ERSAT-GGC adopted mitigation rules 
to avoid the migration of TRANS-VBALISE-2 and -3 hazards to ETCS Core Hazard. 
 
9.1 TRANS-VBALISE-2 
Assuming a safe Track Database transmission and storage and referring the Functional FMECA 
performed in ERSAT-GGC D3.1 [R2] ([ERSAT_GGC_D3.2_08]), the Balise Deletion is likely be 
caused by a VB detection fault, or occasionally by VBR-Kernel interface fault: 
 FB-K 1.4.1: The Virtual Balise Detector does not execute its function - The train 
crosses the expected VBs (e.g. VBG_A) without the EVC awareness; 
 FI-K 1.4.1.1: The Virtual Balise information is lost - EVC does not receive the information 
(user bits, time stamp, detection error) upon the last VB (e.g. VBG_A). 
Regardless the TRANS-VBALISE-2 cause, it results in the EVC unawareness of being passing 
over a Virtual Balise Group, unless Linking Information is available.  
 
The ETCS Inherent protection against the Deletion Hazard is still based on Linking function (see § 
3 in D2.1 [R1]). The latter by announcing an advanced list of balise groups that are expected along 
the route associated to the current MA, ensures EVC the capability to check whether a given balise 
group has been read within a certain Expectation Window (the window in which a balise group can 
be accepted). As specified in SUBSET-026 [R3], in case of two expected BG missing the Service 
Brake is activated. 
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Therefore, if Linking is activated the exceedance of safe speed or distance as advised to ETCS is 
prevented. 
 
While, if the ETCS operating mode has not the Linking function activated, or the Linking Information 
has not already been acquired (i.e. in Start of Mission procedure, before the MA issue), the TRANS-
VBALISE-2 can be hazardous. 
 
As per the Functional analysis of SUBSET-088 Part 2 [R6], if only one balise within a group is 
missed, the message consistency checking is a mitigation.  
However, since the GNSS detection cannot be assumed independent for the virtual balises within 
a group, the abovementioned mitigation is not applicable for a single VB group. 
 
Therefore, since the absence of ETCS inherent protection when Linking is not available, ERSAT-
GGC project confirms the following rules proposed in NGTC project: 
 All Virtual Balise Group shall be marked as “Linked” [ERSAT_GGC_D3.2_01]; 
 To prevent hazardous consequence in case of VB deletion, the safety-critical information 
is not delivered by VBG [ERSAT_GGC_D3.2_02]. 
Although the abovementioned rules, according to [R12], an allocation of 10-10 / hour is made to 
address the minimal probability of missing the first VBG and consequently also the Odometry aid 
in the VB generation.  
9.2 TRANS-VBALISE-3 
The Eurobalise Cross-talk hazard is not properly applicable to the Virtual Balise Concept 
implementation based on GNSS. 
 
However, also on the basis of the D3.1 FMECA analysis [R2], the Insertion Hazard can be referred 
as related to the detection of a wrong but formally correct VBG: 
 FB-K 1.4.4: The VBR output information is other than the expected - Although the block 
has detected the crossing VB (e.g. VBG_A), it outputs the information relative to an undue 
(i.e. wrong) VB. 
The unduly detected VBG can coincide with: 
1. A VBG in an adjacent track, that is similar to the transversal cross talk; 
2. A VBG on the correct track but along an erroneous position, that is similar to the longitudinal 
error. 
A VBG can be unduly detected and its message unduly reported to the on-board Kernel for an 
erroneous preparation or validation of the Track Database, a VBR processing fault (e.g. position 
error not correctly bounded), or an erroneous Track Discrimination.  
 
The Position Report based on an undue (i.e. wrong) BG can lead to hazardous consequences: the 
resulting MA can be not compliant to the actual train position. 
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According to SUBSET-088 Part 2 Functional analysis, ETCS provides two means of inherent 
protection against the Eurobalise Insertion: 
1. The Message consistency check; 
2. The Linking check, which can distinguish whether the received Balise Information is 
erroneous. 
However, the consistency check is not efficient against a Virtual Balise insertion, since there is no 
GNSS independence between the Virtual Balises of the same group. Therefore, without sufficient 
integrity to select the Track (i.e. lack of Linking information) VBR and the Virtual Balise Concept 
can be exposed to hazardous scenarios caused by undue VB insertion. 
 
In some cases, a protection mean for limited spatial intervals, can be the on-board SIL 4 odometry 
based on the multi-sensor technology. Since demonstrated as a valid mitigation technique to any 
residual hazard associated with GNSS misleading information, also Odometry is assumed to be 
used for VB generation (please refer to § 4.3 in D2.1 [R1]). 
 
Furthermore in Staff Responsible (SR) mode where RBC has issued the list of expected balise 
groups in SR authorization, against which the train movements is supervised (please, refer to 
SUBSET-026 [R3] § 4.4.11.1.3), another mean of protection can be ensured. 
 
As a conservative choice against TRANS-VBALISE-3 for cases without Linking, the following rules 
(partially derived by functional FMECA) are required: 
 All Virtual Balises shall be Linked [ERSAT_GGC_D3.2_01]; 
 The Virtual Balise can be provided only once the VBR has been correctly initialized 
[ERSAT_GGC_D3.2_03] – the Track Database has been correctly validated, and the 
occupied Track / Platform is safely discriminated by trackside [ERSAT_GGC_D3.2_05];  
 To prevent hazardous consequence in case of undue VB insertion / missed detection, the 
safety-critical information is not delivered by VBG [ERSAT_GGC_D3.2_02]; 
 The Track Database shall be prepared and validated according to a safe procedure 
[ERSAT_GGC_D3.2_04] [ERSAT_GGC_D3.2_06]; 
The THR allocated to TRANS-VBALISE-3 is amended accounting for almost all the target initially 
allocated to TRANS-VBALISE-2. 
 
TRANS-VBALISE-3 < 0.66*10-9 dangerous failures per hour 
 
Note: the resulting allocation is in line with [R12] analysis. 
10. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR TRANS-VBALISE-2 AND -3 
This Section points out some remarks based on the TRANS-VBALISE protection means and 
potentially hazardous ERSAT-GGC scenarios.  
 
Specifically, the following remarks are addressing the Start of Mission (SoM) Scenario in Line, with 
SR authorization (refer to § 5.6.7 in D2.1 [R1]). 
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10.1 TRANS-VBALISE-2 
In case of SoM with UNKNOWN position, once RBC has approximated the EVC position (i.e. Track 
discrimination has been successfully done), EVC is authorized to move in Staff Responsible (SR) 
mode.  
 
The SR mode allows the driver to move the train under his own responsibility in an ERTMS/ETCS 
equipped area. As per SUBSET-026 specifications, the ETCS on-board Kernel shall supervise the 
train movements, among the others, also against the balise groups giving the order “stop if in SR‟. 
This order shall immediately trip the train, unless the over-passed balise group is included in a list 
of expected balises. 
 
According to ERSAT-GGC operational rules presented in § 9.1, since the hazardous consequence 
of a missed “Stop if in Staff Responsible”, the latter message is not provided by Virtual Balise 
Groups. 
 
The allocation of 10-10 failures / hour considered in § 9.1 is kept to address the minimal probability 
of missing the first Information Point in SR, avoiding the activation of the Odometry based VB 
generation mechanism and leading to an excessively long SR mode. 
10.2 TRANS-VBALISE-3 
In case of SoM scenario with UNKNOWN position and only VBG availability, when the linking 
function is not active, according to § 9.2 the TRANS-VBALISE-3 hazard is likely to occur. 
 
The TRANS-VBALISE-3-SR THR is conservatively set at 0.66*10-9 dangerous failures per hour as 
defined in § 9.2, on the basis of [R12].  
 
Major detail concerning the operational considerations for the cross-talk hazard in SR will be 
provided in future, since some investigations are still undergoing. 
11. THE FINAL APPORTIONMENT 
This Chapter reviews the Preliminary ETCS Core Hazard apportionment of § 7 down to the Balise 
Transmission Subsystem upon the specific Operational Scenario. 
 
Specifically, the following sections focus on the definition of the THR-BTX maximum tolerable rate 
and its top down apportionment to the three identified hazards, for the ERSAT-GGC Operational 
Scenarios defined in D2.1 [R1].  
 
The novel aspect with respect to SUBSET-088 Part 3 analysis is that THR-BTX can be due to two 
distinct and mutually exclusive gates: one associated to the ETS, i.e., THR-EBTX; and the other 
associated to the new VBTS, THR-VBTX. 
 
In each Scenario the THR-BTX is apportioned on the basis of: 
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 SUBSET-088 approach, and assumptions too when still applicable; 
 NGTC D7.7 Fault Tree Analysis; 
 State of the art in GNSS and Augmentation availability and integrity; 
 ERSAT-GGC assumptions for the ETCS Enhanced Functional Architecture [R1]; 
 ERSAT-GGC Operational scenarios [R1]; 
 ERSAT-GGC Qualitative Safety and Hazards analysis outcomes [R2]. 
Please, note that the first Scenario of [R1], i.e. Registration and Start Up, is not studied in the 
following as not involving the actual Balise Transmission Subsystem functions; in Registration and 
Start Up phase the Preliminary ETCS Core THR apportionment is applicable.  
11.1 SOM WITH Q_STATUS = “KNOWN” 
Regardless the SoM location (i.e. Railway Terminal/ Intermediate Station or Line), the train position 
with respect to the LRBG is already known by EVC and validated by RBC. The latter issues the 
MA on the basis of the re-validated last Position Report. Therefore, the SoM procedure is carried 
out without the Balise Transmission Subsystem functions interaction. In this case the THR-BTX 
does not need to be developed further than its three associated hazards, i.e. TRANS-BALISE-1, 
TRANS-BALISE-2 and TRANS-BALISE-3, independently of the Station or Line scenario. 
 
The Fault Tree represented in Figure 5 and the ETCS Core Hazard apportionment described in 
Table 3 and Table 7 are applicable to the SoM with Known Train Position. 
11.2 SOM WITH Q_STATUS = “UNKNOWN” AT TERMINAL / 
INTERMEDIATE RAILWAY STATION 
As per ERSAT-GGC project assumptions, although the deployment of the VBTS enabling the 
Virtual Balise concept, each station is assumed as equipped with PBG. The use of PBG is ensuring 
the delivery of the safety-related information to on-board usually protecting movements in Shunting 
or Staff Responsible modes. 
 
This section analyses the apportionment of the THR-BTX in the Start of Mission scenarios in ETCS 
Level 2, in Station (e.g. Terminal or Intermediate) and in case of Unknown Train Position. 
     
As per UNISIG Specifications, in case of unavailable Known Position Report at the SoM, the RBC 
issues to EVC a Staff Responsible (SR) authorization, aiming at ensuring the Train Localization on 
the basis of the crossed BG.  
 
Note that the ERSAT-GGC Operational scenarios (see [R2]) before the SR authorization foresee 
that the Train Position is “Approximated”. The RBC regards the position of EVC as approximated 
when the EVC is not localized (i.e. the position related to LRBG is unknown), but RBC is able to 
place the train on the track. 
 
Since the unavailability of Linking information during the SoM process and the GNSS performance 
inadequateness for this task, it is assumed that the safe track discrimination shall be ensured by 
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trackside to mitigate the transversal error [ERSAT_GGC_D3.2_09]. Depending on the specific 
scenario the occupied platform / track can be recognized through different checks (e.g. 
NID_ENGINE parameters, TMS-RBC communication). 
 
Concerning the Along Track Train Position, it is ensured from detecting the Physical Balise Groups 
foreseen in Station (see § 5.6.1 and § 5.6.6 in [R1]). 
 
Therefore, the scenario is not introducing differences with respect to the THR-BTX apportionment 
against TRANS-BALISE-1, TRANS-BALISE-2 and TRANS-BALISE-3 presented in SUBSET-088 
Part 3 [R6], including the proper amendment addressing the SR mode (i.e. the most onerous failure 
rate for an information point). 
 
Please refer to the safety targets provided in SUBSET-088 Part 3 [R6] – Annex A, §8. 
11.3 SOM WITH Q_STATUS = “UNKNOWN” IN LINE 
This section addressing the degraded case of SoM in Line with Train Position Unknown completes 
the study of the ERSAT-GGC operational scenarios.  
 
Differently from section § 11.2, herein the unique presence of VBG is assumed. Note that the PBG 
deployment is limited to points where safety-critical information has to be delivered.  
 
At the SoM the ETCS inherent protection provided by Linking is not available.  
 
In this degraded scenario, first the train position is “approximated” (i.e. the occupied track is 
discriminated) from trackside, and afterwards a SR mode is authorized, in order to allow the 
detection of a BG to re-locate the train. 
 
In this scenario the actual BG to be detected is of Virtual type. This section apportions the THR-
BTX, specified in THR-VBTX, introducing some novelties with respect to UNISIG SUBSET-088 
Part3.  
 
For the sake of traceability, the modifications with respect to SUBSET-088 Part 3 are traced in 
different colours: 
 All the gates and events modified with respect SUBSET-088 Part 3 in either description or 
apportionment after VBTS integration are traced in orange colour; 
 All the new gates and events as introduced herein are traced in grey colour. 
Furthermore, in the Tables below remarks are provided to identify analogies and differences with 
reference to NGTC D7.7 F. 
 
The THR allocation to be undertaken by the single supplier are traced by “-“ in the following Tables. 
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11.3.1 THR-VBTX-SR Apportionment 
 
Figure 6 – The THR-VBTX-LINE-SR apportionment down to TRANS-VBALISE-1, 2, 3 
FT Gate / Event Description Apportioned THR Remarks 
THR-BTX-LINE-SR 
Balise Subsystem Hazard in 
LINE, with SR Authorization 
(since Q_STATUS = «Unkown»)  
0.67E-9/h - 
THR-VBTX-LINE-SR 
The Virtual Balise Subsystem 
Hazard in LINE, with SR 
Authorization 
0.67E-9/h - 
TRANS-VBALISE-1-SR 
Corruption Hazard - Incorrect 
VBG message that is received 
by the on-board kernel functions 
as consistent, in SR mode 
1E-11/h 
Applicable only to the VBG 
stored information (i.e. user 
bits). Considered negligible 
with respect to TRANS-
VBALISE-2-SR and TRANS-
VBALISE-3-SR.  
As per NGTC D7.7 F [R11] 
and [R12]. 
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FT Gate / Event Description Apportioned THR Remarks 
TRANS-VBALISE-2-SR 
Deletion Hazard - VBG not 
detected by the on-board 
functions, in SR mode 
1E-10/h 
This THR is allocated as per 
[R12]. It addresses the 
minimal hazardous probability 
of losing the first Information 
Point in SR mode.  
TRANS-VBALISE-3-SR 
Cross-talk Hazard - Inserted 
VBG message received by the 
on-board kernel functions as 
consistent, in SR mode 
0.66E-9/h 
THR considered as per [R12] 
allocating most of THR-VBTX-
LINE-SR to insertion hazard 
instead of deletion. 
DB-H4-1 
Delivery of erroneous virtual 
balise information, interpretable 
as correct, due to a DB 
corruption from RBC 
Negligible 
New event with reference to 
NGTC. 
Non-classed as hazard. 
Mitigated by RBC safe (i.e. 
SIL 4 compliant) design and 
development 
DB-H4-2 
Delivery of erroneous virtual 
balise information, interpretable 
as correct, due to a DB 
corruption from Euroradio 
1E-11/h 
New event with reference to 
NGTC. 
100% of TRANS-VBALISE-1-
SR, and conform to SUBSET-
088 THR allocation to 
Euroradio Corruption Hazard. 
DB-H4-3 
Delivery of erroneous virtual 
balise information, interpretable 
as correct, due to a DB 
corruption from on-board 
Negligible 
New event with reference to 
NGTC. 
Non-classed as hazard. 
Mitigated by On-board Kernel 
safe (i.e. SIL 4 compliant) 
design and development 
H7-SR 
Erroneous localisation of a 
VBG, with reception of valid 
balise information 
0.33E-9/h 
TRANS-VBALISE-3-SR is 
uniformly apportioned 
between H7 and H9 events. 
The FTA below H7 is 
analysed in § 11.3.2. 
H8-SR 
The order of reported Balise, with 
reception of valid balise 
information, is erroneous 
Negligible 
Non-classed as hazard. 
The correct VB order is 
ensured by Odometry 
(designed as safe), which 
cooperate in the VB 
generation. 
 
The correct order of reported 
VB shall be ensured by VBR 
design and development as 
well (see [R1]).  
H9-SR Erroneous reporting of a Balise 
Group in a different track 
0.33E-9/h 
TRANS-VBALISE-3-SR is 
uniformly apportioned 
between H7 and H9 events. 
The FTA below H9 is 
analysed in § 11.3.3. 
Table 8 – The detail of the THR-VBTX-LINE-SR apportionment down to TRANS-VBALISE-1, 2, 3 
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11.3.2 H7-SR Apportionment 
 
Figure 7 - The H7-SR apportionment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
` 
 
 
   
Project: ERSAT GGC 
 
 36 
GNSS Quantitative Analysis for ERSAT 
GGC  
     
                                     
 
FT Gate / Event Description Apportioned THR Remarks 
H7-SR 
Erroneous localisation of a 
VBG, with reception of valid 
balise information 
0.33E-9/h 
TRANS-VBALISE-3-SR is 
uniformly apportioned 
between H7 and H9 events 
VBR-H7 
Erroneous localisation of a VBG, 
with reception of valid balise 
information, due to failure within 
the on-board VBR function - VBG 
position error not correctly 
bounded  
0.33E-9/h 
New event, defined 
analogously to BTM-H7 event 
of Subset-088. 100% 
contributing to H7-SR.  
Refer to ATP-ERR-GT-PL in 
NGTC D7.7 F 
DB-H7 
Erroneous localisation of a VBG, 
with reception of valid virtual 
balise information, due to 
erroneous Track DB data 
preparation 
Negligible 
New event with reference to 
NGTC.  
Considered negligible with 
respect to VBR-H7, since the 
data preparation of the Track 
DB is assumed compliant to a 
SIL4 function.  
Refer to Note 1 below. 
GNSS-MI 
GNSS integrity risk [(ATPE 
>ATPL) and (TTA> X seconds)] 
7.5E-06 / h 
The GNSS Positioning 
integrity risk for Virtual Balise 
Detection, as per ITST 2018 
[R12]. 
It can theoretically be 
achieved with Augmentation 
and RAIM. 
INDEP-CHK 
Independent checks integrity 
risk 
~ 4E-05/h 
The THR that the ERSAT-
GGC Enhanced ERTMS 
architecture should 
approximately meet to close 
the gap between GNSS-MI 
and VBR-H7 target. 
 
The precise THR allocation 
and control depends on the 
specific architecture design 
choices. Refer to Note 2 
below. 
 
The event is only renamed 
with respect to NGTC D7.7 F. 
CHK-MDE-ERR 
Erroneous estimate of minimum 
detectable error (fault-free) 
(MDE > Estimated MDE) 
- 
The THR allocation is to be 
undertaken by the supplier. 
Gate only renamed with 
respect to NGTC D7.7 F 
CHK-ERR Independent checks fault - 
The THR allocation is to be 
undertaken by the supplier. 
Gate only renamed with 
respect to NGTC D7.7 F 
Table 9 - The detail of the H7-SR apportionment 
Note 1: To control DB-H7 the following Required Application Condition (RAC) is defined: 
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Define a procedure to safely address and perform the Track Database Data Preparation. The 
procedure shall be compliant to a SIL 4 function design. [ERSAT_GGC_D3.2_04]  
 
Note 2: The independent checks are assumed to be based on GNSS independent cross-checks, 
for example: 
 Comparing the output of on-board Odometry sensors; 
 Comparing the code and phase measurement upon the pseudo-range; 
 Comparing the coherence between the Virtual Balise Detection and the track occupation 
the information. 
The abovementioned strategies can be differently implemented by the single supplier. The 
upper bound of INDEP-CHK shall be implemented in compliance with the VBR-H7 value 
reported in the table above. 
11.3.3 H9-SR Apportionment 
 
Figure 8 - The H9-SR apportionment 
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FT Gate / Event Description Apportioned THR Remarks 
H9-SR Erroneous reporting of a 
Balise Group in a different track 
0.33E-9/h 
TRANS-VBALISE-3-SR is 
uniformly apportioned 
between H7 and H9 
events 
TR-ERR-SR Erroneous Track Discrimination 0.33E-9/h 
100% of H9-SR. 
Refer to RBC-FAIL-SR in 
NGTC D7.7 F 
DB-H9-1 
Erroneous (incoherent) validated 
Track DB 
Negligible 
New event, with reference 
to NGTC. It is considered 
negligible, since the Track 
DB validation is assumed 
safe. Please, refer to Note 
1 below. 
DB-H9-2 
Erroneous reporting of a Balise 
Group in a different track, with 
reception of valid virtual balise 
information, due to a DB corruption 
from Euroradio 
1E-11/h 
New event with reference 
to NGTC. 
The hazard contribution is 
as negligible as per 
Euroradio Corruption 
Hazard in SUBSET-088. 
DB-H9-3 
Erroneous reporting of a Balise 
Group in a different track, with 
reception of valid virtual balise 
information, due to a DB corruption 
from RBC 
Negligible 
New event with reference 
to NGTC. 
Non-classed as hazard. 
Mitigated by RBC safe (i.e. 
SIL 4 compliant) design 
and development 
DB-H9-4 
Erroneous reporting of a Balise 
Group in a different track, with 
reception of valid virtual balise 
information, due to a DB corruption 
from on-board 
Negligible 
New event with reference 
to NGTC. 
Non-classed as hazard. 
Mitigated by On-board 
Kernel safe (i.e. SIL 4 
compliant) design and 
development 
TMS-XCK-ERR 
Erroneous confirmation of train 
position using TMS information 
Negligible 
New basic event defined 
accordingly to procedure 
defined in § 5.6.2 of [R1], 
and applicable to in Line 
scenario as well  
RBC-XCK-ERR 
Failure of RBC NID_ENGINE 
coherency check (i.e. Train 
"Approximation") 
Negligible 
New basic event defined 
accordingly to procedure 
defined in § 5.6.1 2 of 
[R1], and applicable to in 
Line scenario as well 
Table 10 - The detail of the H9-SR apportionment 
Note 1: To control DB-H9-1 the following Required Application Condition (RAC) is defined: 
 
Define a procedure to safely address and perform the Track Database Validation. The procedure 
shall be compliant to a SIL 4 function design. [ERSAT_GGC_D3.2_06]  
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11.3.4 GNSS-MI Apportionment 
 
Figure 9 - The GNSS-MI apportionment 
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FT Gate / Event Description Apportioned THR Remarks 
GNSS-MI 
GNSS integrity risk [(ATPE 
>ATPL) and (TTA> X seconds)] 
7.5E-06 / h 
The GNSS Positioning 
integrity risk for Virtual Balise 
Detection, as per NGTC D7.7 
F and ITST [R12]. 
It can theoretically be 
achieved with Augmentation 
and RAIM. 
FAULT-FREE 
Ground segment Fault Free 
system integrity risk (without any 
failure in the system) 
2.4 E-6/h 
Allocation determined on the 
basis of translated SBAS 
APV-I performances in 
aviation [R12]. 
Considered as per NGTC 
D7.7 F and ITST [R12]. 
SIS-MI Integrity risk due to SIS MI 2.4 E-6/h 
Allocation determined on the 
basis of translated SBAS 
APV-I performances in 
aviation [R12]. 
Considered as per NGTC 
D7.7 F and ITST [R12]. 
USER-MI Integrity risk due to user MI (local 
effect on signal) 
2.4 E-6/h 
Additional allocation included 
for modelling Railway 
Environment effects on 
received signal [R12] 
Considered as per NGTC 
D7.7 F and ITST [R12]. 
IONO-UNDET 
Undetectable ionospheric 
perturbation (out of worst iono 
model conditions) 
- 
Event as per aviation 
apportionment.  
Position domain performances 
in railway environment to be 
proven by the supplier. 
USR-SEG-ERR 
Out-of-bounds user segment 
errors(extreme multipath,noise, 
tropospheric errors) 
- 
These errors are those not 
mitigated by SBAS or VBR 
barriers protecting user 
against local feared events. 
Position domain performances 
in railway environment to be 
proven by the supplier. 
UDRE-TAIL-EFF UDRE tails effects - 
Event as per aviation 
apportionment. 
Position domain performances 
in railway environment to be 
proven by the supplier. 
ATPL-FORMULA 
ATPL formula leads to wrong 
translation of PR bounds to 
position bounds 
- 
The position bounds shall be 
referred as constrained along 
track.  
Position domain performances 
in railway environment to be 
proven by the supplier. 
GIVE-TAIL-EFF 
GIVE tails effects - 
Event as per aviation 
apportionment. 
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FT Gate / Event Description Apportioned THR Remarks 
Position domain performances 
in railway environment to be 
proven by the supplier. 
MULTIPATH Multipath at train antenna not  
bounded by σ_multipath 
belong to  
[3.33E-9/h, 8E-7/h 
] 
Gate partially modified with 
reference to NGTC. 
Refer to § 11.3.4.1 for the 
THR range derivation 
NLOS Undetected NLOS at train 
antenna 
belong to  
[3.33E-9/h, 8E-7/h 
] 
Gate partially modified with 
reference to NGTC. 
Refer to § 11.3.4.1 for the 
THR range derivation 
PR-NOISE 
PR noise due to interference 
near 
train not bounded σ_noise 
belong to  
[3.33E-9/h, 8E-7/h 
] 
Gate partially modified with 
reference to NGTC. 
Refer to § 11.3.4.1 for the 
THR range derivation 
USER-MPATH Severe Multipath at train antenna - 
The frequency of this event is 
still under investigation. It will 
be consolidated in X2Rail 
MPATH-DIAG 
Failure of MPATH detection and 
exclusion 
- 
The definition of the multipath 
detection mean (e.g. Railway 
RAIM algorithm) depends on 
the specific supplier design 
choices, but it shall be 
compliant to the platform safe 
design. 
USER-NLOS NLOS at train antenna - 
The frequency of this event is 
still under investigation. It will 
be consolidated in X2Rail 
NLOS-DIAG 
Failure of NLOS detection and 
exclusion 
- 
The definition of the multipath 
detection mean (e.g. Railway 
RAIM algorithm) depends on 
the specific supplier design 
choices, but it shall be 
compliant to the platform safe 
design. 
USER-NOISE Interference near train antenna - 
The frequency of this event is 
still under investigation. It will 
be consolidated in X2Rail 
ERR-NOISE-EST Erroneous σ_noise estimation - 
The definition of the multipath 
detection mean depends on 
the specific supplier design 
choices, but it shall be 
compliant to the platform safe 
design. 
Table 11 - The detail of the GNSS-MI apportionment 
11.3.4.1. The Multipath, NLOS and PR-NOISE targets: 
The THR allocation to the 3 events MULTIPATH, NLOS, PR-NOISE depends on the failure 
frequency of the safety functions mitigating the identified GNSS signal errors leading to a position 
failure (case where (ATPE >ATPL)), and the environmental effect frequency. 
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A risk of integrity occurs if an alert is not activated in dangerous cases (i.e. cases where the position 
is failed and the TTA value is exceeded). Today safety processes detecting such kind of errors are 
still in development and their performance may be expressed with a confidence level. 
 
Therefore to allocate a THR to the 3 events MULTIPATH, NLOS, PR-NOISE, it can be considered, 
in a first vision, that these THRs take a value included in an interval to consider the evoked 
variability of the environment and the confidence level of the safety processes. So a THR interval 
can rather be allocated instead of a THR value. 
 
Let THReq be the THR of the output event of an “OR” gate having in input three basic 
events. This THR is such as THReq=THR1+THR2+THR3 , with here: 
• THReq is associated to the event “USER-MI” 
• THR1 is associated to the event “MULTIPATH” 
• THR2 is associated to the event “NLOS” 
• THR3 is associated to the event “PR-NOISE” 
The objective of the optimisation problem is to compute the intervals of THRi 
(i=1,2,3) such that THReq< 2.4E-6/h 
 
 
Using a simple mathematical formulation of this problem, this leads to: 
• Solve a linear systems of equations where the THReq of the output event is known to 
lie in a specified range (here THReq< 2,4E-6/h)  
• The variables are THRi (i=1,2,3)  
 
 
To solve this problem, two methods can be given: 
• To use the interval arithmetic to enable computation of intervals containing the elements of 
the exact solution of THRi (i=1,2,3).  
• To solve the linear interval system Ax = b where x and b are known to be in form of vector 
intervals using then Gaussian elimination and Krawczyk’s method. 
 
Considering the first method, the INTLAB Matlab toolbox is used to solve the problem: 
A=[infsup(1,1) infsup(1,1) infsup(1,1)] 
b=infsup(0.00000001,0.0000024) 
format long 
X=verifylss(A,b) 
 
The toolbox gives the following solution: 
intval A =    1.00000000000000   1.00000000000000   1.00000000000000 
intval b =   1.0e-005 *[   0.00100000000000,   0.24000000000000]  
intval X =   1.0e-006 *[   0.00333333333333,   0.80000000000001] [   0.00333333333333,   
0.80000000000001] [   0.00333333333333,   0.80000000000001] 
 
This finally leads to THRi (i=1,2,3) belong to [3.33E-9, 8E-7] 
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To be able to continue the allocation in the tree Figure 9, the optimization problem for imprecise 
THR allocation with an AND gate needs to be analysed further as it becomes a non-linear problem.  
 
The allocation of imprecise THR to the 3 events is a top-down "allocation process". An "interval 
propagation" process may allow verifying, in a second stage with a bottom-up process, the 
allocation process done in first phase. 
Indeed, the bottom-up process makes possible to propagate the intervals related to the imprecise 
THR obtained previously, in the entire tree. With this interval propagation, it can then be verified 
that the interval obtained by propagation for the top event contains the safety target initially fixed. 
This constitutes an uncertainty analysis. Two methods are proposed to perform such uncertainty 
analysis (1.: Two-phase nested Monte Carlo simulation, 2: Interval analysis). 
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12. CONCLUSIONS 
This deliverable constitutes the GNSS Quantitative Analysis for ERSAT-GGC carried out on the 
Enhanced ERTMS/ETCS functional architecture with VBTS. 
The analysis has been developed in compliance with the apportionment methodology of SUBSET-
091 [R7] and SUBSET-088 Part 3 [R6]. 
This document considers in input the previous NGTC D7.7 Appendix F analysis [R11], and 
enhances it on the basis of ERSAT-GGC Enhanced ERTMS/ETCS functional architecture, and 
Operational Scenarios. 
Based on the final apportionment performed in § 11, a set of safety requirements for technical 
interoperability are defined for the Enhanced ERTMS/ETCS Functional Architecture. 
As a result, considering the integrity needed for the Virtual Balise Concept (TRANS-VBALISE-3-
SR < 10-9 / hour) and the level of integrity ensured by the GNSS information including augmentation 
(GNSS-MI = 7.5E-06 / h), the combination of GNSS and Augmentation allows to conceive the 
Virtual Balise Concept, provided that the technical conditions reported as [ERSAT_GGC_D3.2_xx] 
in the document are fulfilled.  
As an outcome of the analysis, Table 12 highlights the main numerical targets derived from the 
Fault Tree Analysis. 
Note: as per SUBSET-091 [R7], the THRs < 1.0E-9 dangerous failure/ hour shall be addressed 
with a SIL 4 compliant safety process. 
FT Gate / Event Description 
DB-H4-2 
Target for Track Database corruption due to its delivery on-board: 
 
1E-11/h 
 
This target is defined assuming that the Track DB is delivered in compliance to current 
THR allocation for Euroradio Corruption Hazard. 
 
TRANS-VBALISE-2-SR 
Target for the Deletion Hazard in SR mode: 
 
1E-10/h 
 
THR in line with [R12]. 
TRANS-VBALISE-3-SR 
Target for the Cross-talk Hazard in SR mode: 
 
0.66 E-9/h 
 
THR in line with [R12]. 
VBR-H7 
Target for the erroneous localisation of a VBG, with reception of valid balise information, 
due to failure within the on-board VBR function - VBG position error not correctly 
bounded by VBR. 
 
0.33E-9/h 
 
This target is compatible with a SIL4 function design 
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FT Gate / Event Description 
GNSS-MI 
Target for the GNSS integrity risk [(ATPE >ATPL) and (TTA> X seconds)]. From ITST 
2018 [R12], the target is: 
 
7.5E-06 / h 
 
That is assumed as theoretically be achievable with Augmentation and Railway RAIM 
support. 
INDEP-CHK 
Target for the Independent checks integrity risk. 
 
~ 4E-05/h 
 
That is the estimated THR for ERSAT-GGC Enhanced ERTMS architecture, needed to 
meet VBR-H7 target, provided the GNSS integrity risk and fault tree structure (i.e. AND 
Gate). 
TR-ERR-SR 
Target for the Erroneous Track Discrimination: 
 
0.33E-9/h. 
 
As GNSS performance is inadequate for track discrimination at these levels of integrity 
with an alarm limit of approximately 3m, it is assumed that at the SoM the incorrect track 
is mitigated through external trackside actors (e.g RBC, TMS, Interlocking, etc..). 
 
Note: This target is compatible with a SIL4 function design 
Table 12 – The main numerical requirements derived through the FTA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
` 
 
 
   
Project: ERSAT GGC 
 
 46 
GNSS Quantitative Analysis for ERSAT 
GGC  
     
                                     
 
REFERENCES 
[R1] ERSAT GGC_WP2 D2.1, “Enhanced Functional ERTMS Architecture Capable of 
using GNSS and Public Radio TLC Technologies”, Rev 1. 
[R2] ERSAT_GGC_WP3_D3.1, “Safety Analysis of ERSAT ERTMS Application over 
GNSS” Rev 0.2. 
[R3] UNISIG – “SUBSET-026 System Requirements Specification”, Ver. 3.6.0. 
[R4] UNISIG – “SUBSET-023 Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations”, Ver. 3.3.0. 
[R5] UNISIG – “SUBSET-036 FFFIS for Eurobalise”, Ver. 2.4.1. 
[R6] UNISIG – “SUBSET-088 ETCS Application Levels 1 & 2 - Safety Analysis” Ver 
3.6.0. 
[R7] UNISIG – “SUBSET-091 Safety Requirements for the Technical Interoperability of  
ETCS in Levels 1 & 2”, Ver 3.6.0. 
[R8] CENELEC EN 50126-1, “Railway Applications - The Specification And 
Demonstration Of Reliability, Availability, Maintainability And Safety (RAMS) - Part 
1: Generic Rams Process”, 1999. 
[R9] CENELEC EN 50129, “Railway applications – Communication, signalling and 
processing systems – Safety related electronic systems for signalling”, 2003. 
[R10] CENELEC EN 50159, “Railway Applications - Communication, Signalling and 
Processing Systems - Safety-Related Communication in Transmission Systems”, 
2010. 
[R11] NGTC project, “Safety Analysis Part 2 – Preliminary Assessment of the Virtual 
Balise Subsystem for THR Apportionment”, Appendix F of the Deliverable 7.7 
“Results of the Safety Analysis, ETCS Application Level 2 – Virtual Balise 
Detection using GNSS”, Document NGTC-WP7-D7.7-00F-ESA-V09, 31/08/2016. 
[R12] “A Preliminary Apportionment of Safety Targets for Virtual Balise Detection using 
GNSS in Future Evolutions of ERTMS”, C. Wullems, F. Sperandio, M. Basso, S. 
Sturaro, S. Sabina, ITST 2018. 
 
